Chapter 3: Hedonism

Let’s start this chapter with two questions.The first is:

1. What are the components of a good life?

Admittedly, this is a bit of an odd question. Perhaps, for example, you think that having a certain amount of money is important for a person’s life to go well. You probably don’t think, however, that this is all that there is to having a good life. If it was, then the IRS could determine whose lives are good, and whose are not. That seems fairly silly. That’s not to say that financial stability isn’t helpful in someone’s life being good; it just means that a good life is more than just that. So, then, what else is it?

Perhaps you think that close relationships with friends or family contribute to a good life also. Someone who has a few deep and meaningful relationships may be closer to having a good life than someone who does not. Additionally, having a job that you enjoy may be a component of having a good life, as may be developing certain character traits such as patience and generosity. If this is on the right track, then having a good life is a pretty complex and difficult to define issue.

The hedonist, however, looks at all of this and thinks that we are making things too complex and difficult. Yes, they will admit, financial stability, friends and family, a good job, etc. do contribute to a good life. The issue that the hedonist sees, however, is that we are not focusing on the second question:

1. Is there something that unifies all of those components?

The hedonist claims that the answer to this question is a yes. They hold that there is something common to financial success, close relationships, and whatever else you want to answer (1) with. A life is good, according to hedonism, when that life is filled with a sufficient amount of pleasure or happiness. A life is bad, according to hedonism, when that life either has not acquired a sufficient amount of happiness, or if that life is filled with a sufficient amount of pain. They are called hedonists because the Greek word hēdonē means pleasure. Since hedonists claim that only one thing is of special value in life, they are categorized as monists about value (since mono means one).

Our first reading comes to us from the ancient Greek philosophy Epicurus. In the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus seeks to explain what his philosophy of life is, and (perhaps more importantly) what it is not. Oftentimes, hedonism is characterized as the simplistic view that you should maximize as much pleasure as possible for yourself. If you can imagine such a person, they would likely be selfish and only concerned with you to the degree that it makes them happy. This is not how Epicurus wants you to understand hedonism.

Our second reading comes to us from the philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick takes on a fairly tough task in chapter ten of his book The Examined Life. On the face of it, it should be fairly easy to prove that hedonism is false since it claims that there is only one good in human life (i.e. happiness). To show that hedonism is false, all you need to do is point to one thing that is good for human life but is unrelated or independent of the production of happiness. As we’ll discuss in class, this can be quite difficult. Nozick, however, uses a thought experiment to help us isolate such a good (or goods).

Handout:

The Problem: Explaining what makes life good

Epicurus frames his ethics around a fundamental question:

What makes a human life good or bad for the one living it?

This ancient problem of the human good stands at the intersection of ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. For Epicurus, the answer involves a hedonistic conception of value—but not of the crude, sensualist variety.

He writes in response to:

• Popular misconceptions about pleasure.
• Philosophical mischaracterizations of hedonism.
• Widespread fears about death, gods, and fate that disturb human tranquility.

Epicurus’s Solution: Tranquil Hedonism

Epicurus argues that pleasure is the telos (end or goal) of life, but this should be understood as a specific kind of pleasure:

The absence of bodily pain (aponia) and mental disturbance (ataraxia).

Pleasure is the first good (LM 128), and everything is evaluated in relation to it. Yet Epicurus distinguishes between:

• Kinetic pleasures (active stimulation, e.g., eating)
• Katastematic pleasures (stable states, e.g., being free from pain or fear)

He prioritizes the latter.

I. Hedonism Refined

(Epicurus to Menoeceus; Principal Doctrines §§ III–V, VIII, XIX–XX)

• Not all pleasures are to be pursued, and not all pains avoided. Practical reasoning (phronēsis) must guide our choices (PD VIII, LM 132).
• Pleasure is natural and innate, but maximizing pleasure requires understanding which pleasures are natural and necessary (LM 130–131).
• True pleasure comes not from indulgence, but from sober reasoning, moderation, and philosophical understanding (LM 132–133).
• Prudence (phronēsis) is the greatest virtue because it enables one to discern which pleasures lead to genuine tranquility (LM 132, PD V).

“We do not mean the pleasures of profligates… but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the soul.” – LM 132

II. Death Is Nothing to Us

(LM 124–125; PD II)

Epicurus’s most famous argument concerns the irrational fear of death.

• Death is not an evil: it is simply the absence of sensation, and therefore not something that can affect us.
• His famous maxim:“When we exist, death is not; and when death is, we are not.” – LM 125
• Fearing death is irrational: it causes pain in life for something that cannot harm us.
• He draws a parallel between the non-existence before birth and the non-existence after death, neither of which should trouble us.

III. Natural Desires and the Simplicity of the Good Life

(LM 127–130; PD XXIX–XXX)

Epicurus offers a psychological breakdown of desire:

• Natural and necessary (e.g., food, shelter)
• Natural but not necessary (e.g., luxury)
• Vain and groundless (e.g., power, fame)

“The wealth demanded by nature is easy to obtain; the wealth demanded by idle imagination stretches to infinity.” – PD XV

• By disciplining desire, one can find freedom (autarkeia) and self-sufficiency.
• Simple pleasures, such as bread and water, are enough if one is free from pain (LM 130).

IV. Virtue and the Pleasant Life

(LM 132; PD V, XVII)

• Epicurus responds to the charge that hedonism undermines virtue. He insists:”It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly.”
• Virtue is not a constraint on pleasure but the necessary means to it.
• Virtuous living ensures tranquility, which is the ultimate pleasure.

V. Justice as Social Contract

(PD XXXI–XXXVII)

Epicurus adopts a proto-contractarian account of justice:

• Justice is not natural in the Platonic sense, but a mutual agreement not to harm or be harmed.
• There is no intrinsic wrongness in injustice, only the disturbance and insecurity it causes.
• Laws and customs are just insofar as they serve utility (PD XXXIII–XXXVII).
• This leads to a contingent and context-sensitive account of justice.

VI. Friendship, Security, and the Political Life

(LM 126–127; PD XXVII, XL)

• Friendship is essential to achieving tranquility:“Of all the things that wisdom provides… the greatest is friendship.” – PD XXVII
• However, the ideal life is quiet, withdrawn, and non-political.
  • Engaging in public life invites disturbance and insecurity.
  • Security (asphaleia) is a necessary condition of the good life (PD VI, XIV).

VII. Theology and Natural Science

(LM 124–126; PD I, X–XIII)

• The gods exist, but they are blessed and immortal and unconcerned with human affairs (PD I).
• The superstitious fear of divine punishment is a major source of psychological disturbance.
• Understanding the natural world through philosophy and science dispels these fears:
  • Especially fears about the heavens, death, and fate (PD XI–XII).

VIII. Fate, Necessity, and Freedom

(LM 132–133)

• Epicurus denies deterministic fatalism:“Some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some are under our control.”
• While we cannot escape chance, we are free to choose wisely.
• Epicurus is committed to moral responsibility, as praise and blame make sense only if some actions are voluntary.

Conclusion: Living Like a God Among Men

Epicurus ultimately offers a comprehensive philosophy:

• Dispel unnecessary fears (of gods, death, fate).
• Satisfy only natural and necessary desires.
• Seek virtue, tranquility, and friendship.
• Withdraw from public and political turmoil.

“Meditate on these things… and you will live like a god among men.” – LM 134

Handout:

The Problem: What Really Matters for a Good Life?

Nozick begins by probing a fundamental question in ethics and the philosophy of life: Is happiness the highest good? Or, put more precisely:

Is happiness all that matters in determining whether a life is good or worth living?

This question becomes especially pressing in light of hedonism, the view that pleasure (or happiness) is the sole intrinsic good. Hedonism undergirds many modern assumptions—cultural, economic, even philosophical.

But Nozick believes this view is deeply flawed. His central problem is thus a challenge to the adequacy of hedonic theories of the good life. Can happiness—understood as subjective well-being—capture all that we care about in life?

The Solution: A Multi-Dimensional Conception of the Good Life

Nozick argues that happiness is not sufficient for a good life. While undeniably important, it is not the sole or even the ultimate value. He suggests that we value other things more deeply, such as:

• Being in contact with reality
• Living authentically and morally
• Having achievements that are real, not illusory

His broader solution is to reorient our evaluative framework away from internal mental states alone and toward a richer, more objective account of what gives life meaning.

Nozick’s Critique of Hedonism

1. The Experience Machine Thought Experiment

Nozick reprises and develops his famous thought experiment (first introduced in Anarchy, State, and Utopia):

Suppose you could plug into a machine that would give you only pleasurable experiences, simulating an ideal life. Would you do it?

He argues that most people would not, and this shows we value more than mere experience. We want:

• To be a certain way, not just feel as if we are.
• To do real things, not simulated ones.
• To relate to reality, not live in illusion.

This argument is a decisive refutation of hedonism: if pleasure were all we valued, we would plug in.

2. The Problem of False Happiness

Nozick explores cases of people who are happy, but whose happiness is based on deception, manipulation, or ignorance (e.g., a happy spouse whose partner is secretly unfaithful).

Is their life still good? Intuitively, we think not.

Thus, truth and authenticity matter independently of happiness.

3. The Flattening of Value

He critiques hedonism for reducing all values to a single dimension—pleasure. But human life is textured:

• We value love, knowledge, creativity, justice, and these do not reduce to happiness.
• Hedonism flattens moral and existential richness.

Nozick’s Positive Account: What Really Matters

1. Being Connected to Reality

The good life involves engagement with the world as it is, not just pleasurable illusions. He stresses:

• Truth over comforting fantasy
• Real relationships over simulated ones
• Objective achievement over delusional success

2. Becoming and Being a Certain Kind of Person

Nozick emphasizes moral and personal development. A good life is not just about feeling good—it’s about:

• Developing virtues
• Acting rightly
• Becoming worthy of love and respect

These dimensions are irreducible to happiness, though they may contribute to it.

3. The Multi-Dimensional Life

He suggests a pluralist model of value: lives can be better or worse along many dimensions, including:

• Moral (How just or compassionate is a life?)
• Aesthetic (Is it beautiful or expressive?)
• Narrative (Does it form a meaningful story?)
• Relational (Are there deep, authentic bonds?)

He rejects the idea that these values can be aggregated or reduced to a single metric like happiness.

Philosophical Context and Relevance

Nozick is responding to a tradition that stretches from Epicurus and Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) to contemporary positive psychology. His work stands as a rebuttal to the idea that:

• The only intrinsic good is a mental state (pleasure, satisfaction)
• The good life is essentially an inner experience

He aligns more with Aristotelian virtue ethics and existentialist concerns about authenticity and meaning.

“Happiness does not cover everything we value, nor everything that makes a life good” (p. 242).

This connects strongly with themes in moral psychology, value pluralism, and critiques of consumer culture.