Reading 1: Sally Sedgwick – Introduction

The Problem: Can Morality Be Grounded in Reason Alone?

Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork attempts to answer a central philosophical question:

What is the basis of morality, and can it be justified a priori, by reason alone?

Kant believes that moral principles must be:

• Universal (applying to all rational beings)
• Necessary (not contingent on desires or outcomes)
• A priori (independent of experience)

This is in direct contrast to empiricist or consequentialist traditions (e.g., Hume, Mill), which base moral principles on outcomes like happiness or observable behavior. Kant sees such approaches as inadequate because they make morality contingent and variable.

Kant’s solution is to argue that morality is grounded in the form of rational will itself—the structure of reason as practical—and that moral laws are expressions of that structure.

Sedgwick’s Framing of the Groundwork

Sally Sedgwick introduces Kant’s Groundwork as a foundational project in moral philosophy. Her goal is to clarify Kant’s motivations, major claims, and argumentative strategy.

She frames the Groundwork around two key aims:

1. To identify and articulate the supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative).
2. To show that morality is binding on all rational agents because of their rational nature.

This makes the Groundwork simultaneously a metaethical and normative project.

Key Features of Kant’s Moral Philosophy (as presented by Sedgwick)

1. The Moral Law Is Not Empirical

• Kant rejects the idea that we can derive moral laws from experience, desire, or happiness.
• Empirical accounts fail to deliver necessary and universal laws.
• Freedom and rationality are the basis of the moral law, not pleasure or inclination.

Sedgwick explains that for Kant, moral obligation must hold regardless of consequences. This separates him from utilitarians like Mill or hedonists like Epicurus.

2. The Good Will

• The only thing “good without qualification” is a good will.
• Talents, intelligence, or even virtues like courage can be used for evil without a good will.
• A good will is good in virtue of its willing—not because of the consequences it produces.

This introduces the idea that moral worth comes from acting from duty, not merely in accordance with duty.

3. The Categorical Imperative

The central concept of Kant’s ethics, and the main philosophical innovation of the Groundwork, is the categorical imperative (CI).

A categorical imperative commands universally and unconditionally:

Sedgwick explains three formulations of the CI:

• Universal Law Formula: Moral principles must be universalizable.
• Humanity Formula: Treat humanity, in oneself or others, always as an end, never merely as a means.
• Autonomy Formula: The will is the source of moral law, legislating for itself.

Kant’s Argumentative Strategy (as Sedgwick presents it)

Sedgwick outlines the structure of the Groundwork as a movement through three key propositions:

Section I: Ordinary Moral Cognition

• Starts with common-sense morality.
• Shows how everyday moral judgments implicitly assume duties are unconditional.

Section II: A Priori Foundations

• Introduces the categorical imperative.
• Uses thought experiments (e.g., lying promises, neglecting talents) to show how certain maxims fail the test of universalizability.

Sedgwick emphasizes the form of maxims and how rational agents must endorse only those they can will as universal law.

Section III: Freedom and Autonomy

• Connects freedom of the will to the possibility of moral obligation.
• To be autonomous is to act from laws one gives oneself—not from external causes.

Sedgwick notes that moral obligation and freedom are two sides of the same coin for Kant:

We are bound by the moral law because we are free—and free because we are bound by the moral law.

Contrasts with Utilitarianism and Hedonism

Sedgwick’s introduction makes the following contrasts clear:

Reading 2: Christine Korsgaard – The Right to Lie

The Problem: Does Kantian Morality Render Us Powerless in the Face of Evil?

Kant’s moral philosophy is often accused of rigorism—demanding strict adherence to moral rules regardless of consequences. The classic case: Kant’s apparent claim that it is wrong to lie even to a murderer asking where your friend is.

Korsgaard frames the problem as this:

Can a moral theory that categorically forbids lying—even to evil people—be reconciled with our intuitive sense of moral responsibility?

Korsgaard’s Project

Korsgaard aims to defend Kantian ethics against the charge that it is morally blind in extreme cases, but not by simply softening Kant’s rules. Rather, she proposes a reinterpretation of Kant’s system as a double-level theory—with different moral expectations for ideal vs. non-ideal conditions. Her central thesis is:

Kantian ethics can and should distinguish between ideal moral principles and principles for dealing with evil—without collapsing into consequentialism.

1. Universal Law and the Case of the Murderer

Korsgaard argues that lying to the murderer at the door can pass Kant’s Formula of Universal Law:

• Normally, lying undermines trust and thus contradicts its own purpose.
• But in the case of a deceiver, the act of lying is aimed at defeating a deception.
• If everyone lied in that context, the lie would still be effective, because the murderer is deceived about whether you know who he is.

Conclusion: Lying in this case does not contradict the universalizability requirement.

2. Humanity as an End: The Harder Standard

The Formula of Humanity, however, provides a stricter test:

• It requires that we treat others as ends, never merely as means.
• Lying always involves using someone as a means—you manipulate their reason to get a result.
• Even if the person is evil, deception treats their rational agency instrumentally.

So while the Universal Law formula may permit lying in some cases, the Humanity formula condemns it.

3. Kant’s Account of Responsibility

Why does Kant claim that liars are morally and legally responsible for the unforeseeable consequences of their lies?

Korsgaard explains this as grounded in Kant’s idea of:

• Moral responsibility = initiating causal chains by reason.
• If you lie, you are trying to control the world, removing others’ ability to rationally choose.
• In that sense, you assume moral ownership of the outcome—even if it’s not fully foreseeable.

4. Coercion and Deception as Fundamental Wrongs

Using the Formula of Humanity, Korsgaard identifies:

• Deception: Treats someone’s reason as a tool.
• Coercion: Treats someone’s body as a tool.

These are categorically wrong under ideal Kantian ethics because they deny others their status as first causes in a moral world—the basic idea of autonomy.

5. The Need for a Nonideal Theory

Korsgaard introduces a Kantian version of ideal vs. nonideal theory (drawing from John Rawls):

• Ideal theory: Assumes universal compliance and uses the Formula of Humanity as the guiding ideal (the “Kingdom of Ends”).
• Nonideal theory: Recognizes the existence of evil and addresses cases like the murderer at the door.

In nonideal conditions, we need special principles to guide action when others have already violated moral norms.

6. Lying as Self-Defense

From this perspective:

• Lying to a liar (or a murderer) can be justified as self-defense.
• Korsgaard cites Kant’s Lectures on Ethics to support this: if someone uses deception to trap you, you may respond in kind without being morally culpable.

Key claim: When someone abandons moral norms (by coercing or deceiving), they forfeit their claim to be treated according to those norms.

7. Casuistical Cases and the Moral Limits of Lying

Korsgaard discusses two complex cases:

• The philanthropist who uses deception for good ends: Korsgaard argues you can lie to him, but you probably shouldn’t. His deception is morally wrong, but it doesn’t merit full-scale retaliation.
• Failure to lie to the murderer: Even if not legally blameworthy, failing to lie can be a violation of self-respect and the duty of mutual aid.

8. Suicide, Respect, and Rigorism

She compares lying with another morally fraught issue: suicide.

• Kant’s argument against suicide via the Universal Law is weak.
• But the Humanity formula offers a deeper reason: suicide denies the value of the very rational nature that makes morality possible.

Thus, suicide too might be impermissible ideally, but understandable in extreme nonideal conditions.