Handout:

The Problem: What Does It Mean to Live Well?

Unlike moral theories that focus on rules (deontology) or consequences (utilitarianism), Aristotle begins with a deeper, more fundamental question:

What is good for human beings? What does it mean to live well as a human?

This approach centers on the moral agent, rather than individual acts, and emphasizes character, virtue, and purpose. The goal is not to determine whether a specific action is right or wrong, but to develop the kind of person who reliably does what is right.

The Solution: Virtue as the Key to Human Flourishing (Eudaimonia)

Aristotle proposes that the highest human good—what he calls eudaimonia (commonly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing”)—consists in excellent rational activity over a complete life.

Key Premises:

• Every action aims at some good.
• There must be a highest good (summum bonum) for human life.
• This good must be self-sufficient, final, and intrinsically valuable.
• The highest human good is called eudaimonia, and all other goods are chosen for its sake.

The Function Argument

Aristotle argues that understanding human nature gives us insight into our telos (end or purpose):

• Every being has a characteristic function (ergon).
• A good life is one that fulfills this function excellently (aretê).
• Human beings are rational animals—so our function is activity in accordance with reason.

Thus, eudaimonia is rational activity performed well, i.e., virtuously.

What Is Virtue?

Aristotle divides the soul into:

• Rational part: intellect and deliberation
• Non-rational part: emotions and desires, which can be trained to obey reason

Moral Virtue (Ethikê aretê):

• A disposition concerned with choice.
• It lies in a mean between excess and deficiency, relative to us.
• Determined by practical reason (phronêsis), the capacity to judge appropriately in concrete situations.

Examples: Courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice; temperance is a mean concerning pleasures.

Intellectual Virtue:

• Pertains to reason itself, e.g., wisdom, understanding.
• At its highest, this is contemplation, which Aristotle sometimes treats as the most divine form of activity.

The Role of Practical Wisdom (Phronêsis)

Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that allows a person to:

• Recognize what the virtuous action is in particular contexts.
• Determine the proper mean in feelings and actions.

A virtuous person doesn’t follow rules mechanically but acts with judgment rooted in experience and reason.

Is Virtue Enough for Happiness?

Aristotle famously asserts:

• Virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia.
• External goods (friends, wealth, health) are needed to fully exercise virtue.
• Eudaimonia is an activity, not merely a state, and it requires time to unfold—a single day does not make one happy.

Contrast:

• Stoics: virtue alone suffices for happiness, even in torture or poverty.
• Aristotle: extreme misfortune can prevent eudaimonia.

Aristotle’s Ethical Naturalism

Bowin highlights Aristotle’s view as a form of ethical naturalism:

• Human virtues are grounded in our nature as rational and social beings.
• Virtue is understood analogously to health—as a well-functioning condition of the soul.

Later thinkers (e.g., Anscombe, Philippa Foot) revive this view:

• Moral judgments are grounded in what is objectively good for human beings, given our nature and social needs.

Virtue, Community, and Politics

For Aristotle:

• Humans are political animals—we achieve eudaimonia only in community.
• A self-sufficient life is not solitary; it includes family, friends, and civic participation.

This embeds virtue ethics in a social and political framework—ethics is not just personal development but communal well-being.

Eudaimonia and the Afterlife?

Unlike later thinkers (Aquinas, Avicenna, Alfarabi), Aristotle:

• Does not posit an afterlife-based summum bonum.
• Views the soul as the “form” of the body—no immortal soul.
• Grounds ethics in this-worldly flourishing, rather than otherworldly reward.

Handout:

Framing the Problem: What Is Virtue Ethics Supposed to Do?

Johansson and Svensson begin by distinguishing two central aims of ethical theory:

• Theoretical Aim: To offer a criterion of rightness—that is, to specify what makes an action right.
• Practical Aim: To offer a procedure of decision-making—that is, a method we can use to figure out what to do.

The central question animating their discussion is: Can virtue ethics plausibly fulfill either of these aims?

I. A Candidate Criterion: Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethical Theory (VE)

Rosalind Hursthouse offers the following as a virtue ethical criterion of rightness:

(H): An action is right iff it is what a virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances.

This formulation is refined into:

• (VEa): An action is obligatory iff any virtuous person would characteristically do it.
• (VEb): An action is permissible iff some virtuous person would characteristically do it.
• (VEc): An action is wrong iff no virtuous person would characteristically do it.

This gives us the general position the authors call (VE).

II. Thought Experiment 1: The Pill Example (p. 494)

• Scenario: A virtuous agent chooses between two identical aspirins (pill 1 and pill 2) to give to someone with a headache.
• Issue: On the “any virtuous person” reading, if the virtuous person gives pill 1, then giving pill 2 is not permissible—an implausible result.
• Lesson: We need to distinguish between some vs. any virtuous person interpretations when formulating criteria of rightness.

III. Thought Experiment 2: Circumstances a Virtuous Person Could Never Be In (pp. 495–498)

This objection targets cases where the circumstances are so morally compromised that no truly virtuous person could be in them:

• Example A: Jones has deeply hurt Smith in a way that a virtuous person never would.
• Example B: A man has misled two women (A and B) into bearing his children, but can only marry one. This situation results from prolonged bad behavior.

Objection: How can (VE) apply if there’s no possible world in which a virtuous person finds herself in these circumstances?

Counterpoint 1: Counterpossibles

• According to standard modal logic, all counterpossibles (conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true.
• So, the claim that a virtuous person would act in a certain way if they were in those circumstances might still be (vacuously) true.
• Challenge: But this may license any action as right, since the antecedent is impossible for all alternatives.

Counterpoint 2: Reject the Vacuity Thesis

• Johansson and Svensson propose rejecting the standard view.
• They argue some counterpossibles are non-vacuously true, and we can meaningfully say what a virtuous person would do even in impossible circumstances.

Counterpoint 3: Character Development

• Perhaps someone becomes virtuous after committing the bad acts.
• If so, then a virtuous person might be in those circumstances due to earlier non-virtuous behavior.
• Critics might argue this is incompatible with the historical dimension of virtue—virtue requires a certain development over time.

IV. Thought Experiment 3: The Wrong Right-Maker (pp. 498–502)

A major philosophical worry: (VE) provides the wrong kind of explanation for rightness.

• Suppose you give someone an aspirin to relieve their headache.
• (VE) says it’s right because a virtuous person would do it.
• But intuitively, the right-making feature is relieving the headache—not what a virtuous person would do.

Three Versions of the “Wrong Right-Maker” Objection

(a) Cart Before the Horse I:

• Virtuous agents act because something is right, not the other way around. So VE’s account reverses the direction of explanation.

(b) Cart Before the Horse II:

• What explains why virtuous agents act is some non-moral feature (e.g., suffering), not the action’s rightness. Again, VE’s order of explanation is suspect.

(c) Redundancy of VE:

• If actions are right because they relieve suffering, and this is also why virtuous agents choose them, then VE isn’t offering a distinctive criterion.
• VE, then, lacks explanatory power: it tracks right actions but doesn’t explain them in a deeper or unique way.

V. Thought Experiment 4: Practical Guidance Objections (pp. 502–504)

Even if VE fails as a theoretical account, can it help guide action?

Objection (a): Uncodifiability

• VE tells us to do what a virtuous person would do—but how do we know what that is?
• Virtue concepts (courage, honesty) are vague and require moral perception that only the already virtuous possess.

Analogy: Only an expert wine taster can truly identify a fine wine. Telling a novice to just “taste better” is unhelpful.

Possible Response:

• While full codification may be impossible, practical heuristics are available:
  • Identify relevant factors in a situation.
  • Compare to paradigmatic cases where the virtuous response is clear.
  • Use analogical reasoning to extend understanding to novel cases.

Objection (b): Virtue Conflicts

• What happens when virtues conflict?
  • Benevolence vs. honesty (e.g., lying to Grandma about her hat).
  • Courage vs. parental duty.

Worry: If virtues pull in different directions, how does VE help resolve the conflict?

Virtue Ethical Response:

• In the Aristotelian tradition, virtues are unified through practical wisdom (phronesis).
  • One does not simply add up virtues—rather, the wise agent harmonizes them in judgment.
  • True courage takes account of parental responsibilities, and true benevolence does not conflict with honesty.

VI. Concluding Reflections

Johansson and Svensson ultimately argue that:

• Virtue ethics fails to offer a distinctive or plausible criterion of rightness.
  • Thought experiments about counterpossible circumstances and right-makers undermine its claim to fulfill the theoretical aim.
• But virtue ethics may still serve as a helpful ideal for practical reasoning.
  • If coupled with appropriate guidance mechanisms and understood through analogical reasoning and character development, it may still fulfill the practical aim.

Takeaway: Virtue ethics may not tell us what is right in the abstract, but it may still guide us in becoming the kind of person who does what is right.