Reading 1: John Bowin – Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

The Problem: What Does It Mean to Live Well?

Unlike moral theories that focus on rules (deontology) or consequences (utilitarianism), Aristotle begins with a deeper, more fundamental question:

What is good for human beings? What does it mean to live well as a human?

This approach centers on the moral agent, rather than individual acts, and emphasizes character, virtue, and purpose. The goal is not to determine whether a specific action is right or wrong, but to develop the kind of person who reliably does what is right.

The Solution: Virtue as the Key to Human Flourishing (Eudaimonia)

Aristotle proposes that the highest human good—what he calls eudaimonia (commonly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing”)—consists in excellent rational activity over a complete life.

Key Premises:

• Every action aims at some good.
• There must be a highest good (summum bonum) for human life.
• This good must be self-sufficient, final, and intrinsically valuable.
• The highest human good is called eudaimonia, and all other goods are chosen for its sake.

The Function Argument

Aristotle argues that understanding human nature gives us insight into our telos (end or purpose):

• Every being has a characteristic function (ergon).
• A good life is one that fulfills this function excellently (aretê).
• Human beings are rational animals—so our function is activity in accordance with reason.

Thus, eudaimonia is rational activity performed well, i.e., virtuously.

What Is Virtue?

Aristotle divides the soul into:

• Rational part: intellect and deliberation
• Non-rational part: emotions and desires, which can be trained to obey reason

Moral Virtue (Ethikê aretê):

• A disposition concerned with choice.
• It lies in a mean between excess and deficiency, relative to us.
• Determined by practical reason (phronêsis), the capacity to judge appropriately in concrete situations.

Examples: Courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice; temperance is a mean concerning pleasures.

Intellectual Virtue:

• Pertains to reason itself, e.g., wisdom, understanding.
• At its highest, this is contemplation, which Aristotle sometimes treats as the most divine form of activity.

The Role of Practical Wisdom (Phronêsis)

Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that allows a person to:

• Recognize what the virtuous action is in particular contexts.
• Determine the proper mean in feelings and actions.

A virtuous person doesn’t follow rules mechanically but acts with judgment rooted in experience and reason.

Is Virtue Enough for Happiness?

Aristotle famously asserts:

• Virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia.
• External goods (friends, wealth, health) are needed to fully exercise virtue.
• Eudaimonia is an activity, not merely a state, and it requires time to unfold—a single day does not make one happy.

Contrast:

• Stoics: virtue alone suffices for happiness, even in torture or poverty.
• Aristotle: extreme misfortune can prevent eudaimonia.

Aristotle’s Ethical Naturalism

Bowin highlights Aristotle’s view as a form of ethical naturalism:

• Human virtues are grounded in our nature as rational and social beings.
• Virtue is understood analogously to health—as a well-functioning condition of the soul.

Later thinkers (e.g., Anscombe, Philippa Foot) revive this view:

• Moral judgments are grounded in what is objectively good for human beings, given our nature and social needs.

Virtue, Community, and Politics

For Aristotle:

• Humans are political animals—we achieve eudaimonia only in community.
• A self-sufficient life is not solitary; it includes family, friends, and civic participation.

This embeds virtue ethics in a social and political framework—ethics is not just personal development but communal well-being.

Eudaimonia and the Afterlife?

Unlike later thinkers (Aquinas, Avicenna, Alfarabi), Aristotle:

• Does not posit an afterlife-based summum bonum.
• Views the soul as the “form” of the body—no immortal soul.
• Grounds ethics in this-worldly flourishing, rather than otherworldly reward.

Reading 2: The Oxford Handbook of Virtue – Chapter 25

The Problem: Can Virtue Ethics Guide Action Without Collapsing into Rule-Based Theories?

A longstanding critique of virtue ethics is that it lacks action-guiding principles. Critics argue that it cannot answer basic moral questions like:

“What should I do in this situation?”

This concern is especially pressing in eudaimonist virtue ethics, which grounds moral philosophy in the pursuit of flourishing (eudaimonia). If virtue ethics is primarily about developing good character rather than evaluating individual acts, then:

• How can it help us decide what’s right to do?
• Is it a viable alternative to consequentialism and deontology?

Svensson aims to reassess and defend the action-guiding potential of eudaimonist virtue ethics by clarifying how right action can be understood within the framework of virtue.

The Solution: Understanding Right Action Through the Lens of Practical Wisdom

Svensson argues that eudaimonist virtue ethics can make substantive claims about right action, without importing alien standards from other moral theories. His solution turns on Aristotle’s concept of phronêsis (practical wisdom) as the key to moral judgment.

The right action is the one that the virtuous person would perform in the circumstances as determined by reason.

In this way, right action is derived not from rules or consequences, but from what a practically wise person would do.

1. The Eudaimonist Framework

• Virtue ethics takes eudaimonia (flourishing) as the highest good.
• Moral virtues (like courage, generosity, temperance) are understood as traits necessary for eudaimonia.
• Right action is what contributes to, or is constitutive of, living well.

This differs from rule-based systems, which treat rightness as primary, and virtue as a consequence of doing the right things. In contrast, virtue is prior for eudaimonists.

2. The Priority of the Virtuous Agent

Svensson defends the “virtue-centered” view:

• We understand right action by referring to what a fully virtuous agent would do.
• This makes virtue ethics agent-centered, not act-centered.

But this raises a worry: is this circular? If we define virtue by what leads to flourishing, and right action by what the virtuous agent does, have we explained anything?

Svensson argues that it is not circular, but rather holistic—action and virtue are mutually illuminating.

3. The Role of Practical Wisdom (Phronêsis)

• Practical wisdom is not just knowing rules; it is a sensitive responsiveness to context.
• It includes:
  • Seeing what matters morally in a situation.
  • Weighing competing considerations.
  • Acting with appropriate emotion and motive.

Thus, right action is what practical wisdom identifies as fitting the circumstances, not what fits a moral law or maxim.

4. Right Action Without Codifiability

Svensson emphasizes that:

• Virtue ethics resists codification: there is no list of necessary and sufficient conditions for right action.
• This is a feature, not a bug. Moral life is too complex for fixed rules.

But this doesn’t mean anything goes—it means that sound judgment replaces formal decision procedures. This aligns with Aristotle’s claim that ethics is imprecise, because human life is imprecise.

5. Avoiding Redundancy with Other Theories

Svensson responds to the worry that:

“If virtue ethics just tells us to do what a good person would do, isn’t that empty or vacuous?”

His answer:

• No, because the virtue framework shapes what counts as good.
• The virtues are normative concepts—they contain standards of excellence.
• Saying “be courageous” implies more than “do the right thing”—it says how to be, what to value, and who to become.

6. The “Target-Centered” View of Right Action

Svensson explores the idea, developed by Christine Swanton, that:

• Each virtue aims at a target: e.g., justice aims at fairness, courage aims at noble risk.
• Right action hits the target of all relevant virtues in the situation.

This offers a more granular and action-sensitive account than simply appealing to “what the virtuous agent would do.”

7. Moral Conflict and Pluralism

Svensson acknowledges that conflict between virtues is real and often tragic:

• Courage may demand action that conflicts with prudence.
• Honesty may come at the cost of kindness.

There is no simple calculus for resolving such tensions. Instead, Svensson argues that:

• These tensions reflect the plural structure of value.
• Moral life is about negotiating competing excellences, not maximizing a single metric.